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THE TENTH AMENDMENT SHOOTS DOWN
THE BRADY ACT
Dyan Finguerra*
INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 1981, John Hinckley, Jr. attempted to assassinate
President Ronald Reagan in a desperate effort to impress an actress
on whom he had an obsessive crush.1 During the assassination
attempt, the first of six bullets fired from Hinckley's gun entered
the skull of the president's press secretary, James Brady.2 Although
Brady beat the ten-to-one odds against surviving the surgery, the
bullet left him partially paralyzed.3 James Brady and his wife,
Sarah, were outraged when it became known that, although
Hinckley had a history of mental instability, he had easily obtained
a handgun.4 Proponents of stricter handgun control began lobbying
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 1996. The author wishes to thank
Professors Eve Cary and Susan Herman, Doug Nelson, Andrea Gallitano, Esq.
and Sheriff J.R. Koog for their assistance in preparation of this Note. A special
note of thanks to Teresa Scott, Esq. for her aid from the inception of this Note
through her countless edits, and to my family for their continual support and to
Seth DuCharme for foregoing a Sunday afternoon at the shooting range to edit
my Note.
' Ron Shaffer & Neil Henry, Hinckley Pursued Actress for Months, Letter
Shows, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1981, at Al.
2 David S. Broder, Jim and Sarah Brady: A Thumbs-Up Couple, DET. FREE
PRESS, Nov. 9, 1987, at lIA. President Reagan, a Secret Service agent and a
District of Columbia police officer were also victims of Hinckley's gunfire. H.R.
REP. No. 344, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1984.
' Broder, supra note 2, at 1 A; see also Wayne King, Sarah and James
Brady, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 43.
4 David Behrens, Ten Years of Survival, NEWSDAY, Mar. 5, 1991, at 48.
Giving a false address, Hinckley bought his .22-caliber RG 14 Rohm revolver for
$29.00 from a Texas pawn shop which did not conduct background checks. Id
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for stronger legislation than that provided by the Gun Control Act
of 1968.'
Sarah Brady became a visible leader in the effort to strengthen
America's gun control laws and prevent criminals and mentally
unstable people from obtaining handguns.' Sarah Brady became
the chairperson of Handgun Control, Inc. in 1990,' and worked to
pass legislation, both on the state and national level, to toughen gun
laws. Although several states passed more restrictive legislation
than the federal government,8 state control over the transfer of
firearms remained minimal. Consequently, proponents of gun
Such a check would have revealed incidents that reflect his mental instability and
propensity for violence. For example, Hinckley was under psychiatric care and
was taking Valium at the time of the shooting. He was also ousted from a neo-
Nazi organization because the group's leaders considered him "extremist and too
violent." See Shaffer & Henry, supra note 1, at Al. James Brady contends that
if a mandatory waiting period had been in effect when Hinckley purchased his
gun, he might not have been able to arm himself. Carolyn Skorneck, James
Brady Still Fights Pain, Gun-Control Foes, Firearms, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992,
at A2. Brady commented, "And there's a good chance that I wouldn't be sitting
in wheels today and walking around with a stick." Id.
At trial, Hinckley was found innocent of criminal charges by reason of
insanity and he was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington. Laura
A. Kiernan, A Hinckley Interview, WASH. POST, June 29, 1982, at Al.
' Pub. L. No. 90-612, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 921-930 (1988)). The Gun Control Act of 1968 was passed in the wake of the
shooting deaths of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. and Senator Robert F.
Kennedy. Pierre Thomas, Hit-or-Miss Control ofFirearms: Sales Enforcers Can't
Keep Up with Dealers, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1992, at Al. The statute serves
as the nation's primary gun control law, requiring comprehensive licensing of
federal firearms dealers and detailed record keeping by those dealers. These
procedures enable law enforcement officials to trace weapons used in violent
crimes to their original purchasers. Id. The law also prohibits the sale of firearms
to a person who the dealer "knows or has reasonable cause to believe" is a felon,
a fugitive, a drug addict, an alien, or "a person who has been adjudicated as a
mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution," dishonorably
discharged from the Armed Forces, or to a person who has renounced his or her
citizenship. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d).
6 King, supra note 3, at 43.
Sarah Brady joined Handgun Control, Inc. in 1984. She became vice
chairperson in 1989, and succeeded co-founder Pete Shields as chairperson in
1990. See Behrens, supra note 4, at 48.
' See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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control intensified their efforts to draft federal legislation that
would require all handgun purchasers to submit to a background
check and waiting period.9 Sarah Brady and Handgun Control, Inc.
lobbied on behalf of the "Brady Bill," but their efforts were
stymied for seven years 0 due largely to fierce resistance from the
National Rifle Association of America ("NRA")."l
By instituting a five-day waiting period and mandatory
background check by local law enforcement authorities, the Brady
Bill was intended to "prevent convicted felons and other persons
who are barred by law from purchasing guns from licensed gun
dealers, manufacturers or importers."' 2 According to members of
Handgun Control, Inc., the Brady Bill is important because it
9 Tom Kenworthy, House Easily Defeats "BradyAmendment, "WASH. POST,
Sept. 16, 1988, at Al (discussing the House debate surrounding the inef-
fectiveness of current gun control laws). A 1993 Gallup poll revealed that 88%
of American citizens favor a waiting period. H.R. REP. No. 344, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 9, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984. A "waiting period" is the time
between when a purchaser commits to buying a gun and the time when he or she
may actually leave the store in possession of the gun. Within that time period,
a law enforcement official performs a background check of the purchaser. See
id, at 10.
o The Brady Bill was first introduced in Congress in 1987, but quickly
became the subject of Senate filibusters, amendments, inclusion and removal
from other legislation and presidential veto threats. H.R. REP. No. 344, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984; see also
Naftali Bendavid, Handgun Control Group Reloads, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 20,
1993, at Al; Free For All-Free the Crime Bill, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1992,
at A19; Linda M. Harrington, Gun Fighters; Jim and Sarah Brady May Finally
Win the Battle for the Bill That Bears Their Name, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1993,
(Tempo), at 1.
" For a further discussion of the debate surrounding gun control legislation,
and the Brady Act in particular, see Bob Dole, The Brady Bill: It's Just Not
Enough, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 135 (1993/1994); Andrew Jay McClurg, The
Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 53 (1992); Marc Christopher
Cozzolino, Note, Gun Control: The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 16
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 245 (1992).
12 H.R. REP. No. 344, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984. In contrast to the Gun Control Act of 1968, where it was
sufficient for a purchaser to swear on a federal form that he or she was mentally
stable, not a fugitive, inter alia, the Brady Bill background check requires
verification of the purchaser's statement.
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allows people to "cool off from their anger and from whatever is
disturbing them at the time [that they attempt to purchase the gun],
and also allows for information to get into the system so when [the
chief law enforcement officers] do a background check, it is
accurate."' 3 On November 30, 1993, the Bradys and Handgun
Control, Inc. celebrated a victory over the NR's lobbying power
when President Bill Clinton signed the Brady Handgun Violence
Protection Act ("Brady Act") into law.14
Prior to the Brady Act's passage, only fourteen states had
mandatory waiting periods, 5 nine states required a permit to
purchase a handgun,1 6 and two states required a telephone back-
ground check,' 7 but under the Brady Act all states must meet
minimum federal requirements. Local officials must "make a
reasonable effort to ascertain within five business days whether
receipt or possession would be in violation of the law, including
research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are
" CNN News: President Clinton's Brady Bill Signing Ceremony, (CNN
television broadcast, Nov. 30, 1993) (transcript available in LEXIS, News
library, CNN file).
14 Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended in 18
U.S.C. § 922(s) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The Brady Handgun Violence
Protection Act ("Brady Act") amended the Gun Control Act of 1968.
"s ALA. CODE § 13A- 11-77 (1975) (48 hours); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12071
(West 1992) (15 days); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-37a (West Supp. 1992) (2
weeks); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.065 (West 1992) (3 days); IND. CODE § 35-23-
4.1-7 (1976) (7 days); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 442 (1987) (7 days); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 624.7132 (West Supp. 1994) (7 days); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.420
(1993) (15 days); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6111 (1983) (48 hours); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-47-35 (Supp. 1991) (72 hours); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23-7-9
(1988) (48 hours); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1316 (1991) (15 days); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.090 (West 1988) (5 days); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.35
(West Supp. 1994) (48 hours subject to a 3-day extension).
16 HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-2 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 430, para.
65/3 (Smith-Hurd 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.16 (West 1993); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 129C (West 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.422
(West 1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.080 (Vernon Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:58-3 (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00 (McKinney 1989); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-402 (1993).
17 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448A (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
308.2:2 (Michie Supp. 1994).
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available and in a national system designated by the Attorney
General.""m It is this congressional mandate to local authorities
that has created legal controversy.
Opponents of gun control laws, and the Brady Act in particular,
are challenging the Act's constitutionality in the courts.' 9 Instead
of contesting the Brady Act on Second Amendment grounds" as
they have done in the past,2' the NRA and some rural law
,s 18 U.S.C § 922(s)(2).
'9 Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v. United
States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994); McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp.
321 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex.
1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
20 The Second Amendment states: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
In the court challenges to the Brady Act to date, none have asserted that the
Brady Act violates the Second Amendment. See, e.g., McGee v. United States,
863 F. Supp. 321, 327 (S.D. Miss. 1994) ("This lawsuit... does not implicate
the Second Amendment. This lawsuit involves only the Tenth Amendment and
Article I, § 8 of the Constitution."); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503,
1507 (D. Mont. 1994) ("This is not a case about the Second Amendment. This
case turns on the proper relationship between the federal government and the
several states, and in particular, on the constitutionality of federally imposed,
unfunded mandates to the states.").
2 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178-82 (1939) (upholding
a federal statute which prohibited transportation of a firearm through interstate
commerce and rejecting the objection that the statute usurps states' police
power); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (holding that the Second
Amendment only restricts the federal government and not the states); Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (reaffirming Cruikshank); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (holding that there was no absolute
constitutional right to "bear arms for a lawful purpose"); see also Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980); Konigsberg v. Bar of Cal., 366 U.S.
36, 49-50 n.10 (1961).
For articles exploring the Second Amendment and the gun control debate,
see CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE:
THE ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP
AND BEAR ARMS (1994); Daniel Abrams, Ending the Other Arms Race: An
Argument for a Ban on Assault Weapons, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 488
(1992); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment:
Toward an Afro-A mericanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991); Sanford
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989);
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enforcement officials are contending that the Brady Act violates the
Tenth Amendment.22 According to gun control opponents, the
Tenth Amendment's limitations on the powers of the federal
government prevent it from "commandeering" local authorities to
administer a federal regulatory program without providing an
incentive, such as federal funding. 23 According to critics of the
Brady Act, the federal government is taking "control of state and
local police from the communities they serve . . . divert[ing] them
from their primary duties ... [a]nd tell[ing] state and local
officials, 'Oh, by the way, it's our program, but you foot the
bill."
24
By challenging the Brady Act on Tenth Amendment grounds,
the NRA is reintroducing a controversy "as old as the
Constitution, 2 1 which has been the focus of many of the Court's
"most difficult and celebrated cases., 26 The controversy surrounds
Laurel Loomis, A New Look at Gun Control Legislation: Responding to A
Culture of Violence, 27 BEvERLY HILLS B.A. J. 160 (1993); William Van
Alstyne, The SecondAmendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J.
1236 (1994).
22 The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
23 Robert K. Corbin, "Brady" is Unconstitutional, U.S.A. TODAY, May 20,
1994, at 10A. Mr. Corbin, president of the National Rifle Association of America
("NRA") argues: "The U.S. Congress didn't just roll another unfunded federal
mandate down the Capitol steps. The U.S. Congress violated the U.S.
Constitution. Knowingly." Id.
24 Corbin, supra note 23, at 10A.
25 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1992).
26 Id. at 2417. In New York, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor commented, "At
least as far back as Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the Court has resolved questions
'of great importance and delicacy' in determining whether particular sovereign
powers have been granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government or have
been retained by the States." Id (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816)); see, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery and
holding that Congress may pass laws which are generally applicable to state
sovereigns and the private sector); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 852 (1976) (holding that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from
regulating the states in areas of traditional government functions); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941) (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart,
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the determination of where Congress' powers pursuant to Article I,
section 8 of the Constitution end," and where the powers reserved
to the states pursuant to the Tenth Amendment begin. Because of
the Court's expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause,28
arguing that the commerce power is plenary and rejecting Dagenhart's limit on
Congress' authority to "articles which in themselves have some harmful or
deleterious property"); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937) (finding that because the corporation had operations in many states, a
labor strike of the Pennsylvania intrastate manufacturing operations would have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251, 271-74 (1918) (striking down a federal statute which forbid the interstate
transportation of articles manufactured by companies which employed children
because regulation of manufacturing was a state concern); Houston E. & W. Tex.
Ry. Co. v. United States ("The Shreveport Rate Cases"), 234 U.S. 342, 351-52
(1914) ("Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so
related that the government of the one involves the control of the other, it is
Congress, and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant
rule.. . ."); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824) (holding that the states
do not limit Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce because the
Commerce power is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,
and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution");
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 402-03 (1819) (rejectingthe argument that
the powers of the national government were delegated to it by the states).
27 Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; .... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes; .... To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3, 18.
28 The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[tfo regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Court's landmark decision in
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), is indicative of its broad reading
of the Commerce Clause. The Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 ("FLSA"), which set the minimum hourly and overtime wage requirements
for employees who produced goods for interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
207 (1988). The Court dismissed a Tenth Amendment argument made by Darby,
a lumber manufacturer:
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the exact delineation of authority between the federal government
and the states remains unclear.
Two different approaches to the federalism debate have
emerged.29 In some cases, the Court examined whether a con-
gressional act was authorized by a power expressly delegated to
Congress in Article I of the Constitution.3° In others, the Court
The [Tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its
adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relation-
ship between the national and state governments as it had been
established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its
purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government
might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might
not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers . . . . From the
beginning and for many years the amendment has been construed as
not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all
means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and
plainly adapted to the permitted end.
Darby, 312 U.S. at 124. The reasoning advanced in Darby dominated judicial
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment for over three decades. During this
period, the Court interpreted the Commerce Clause as allowing Congress to
"choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end,
even though they involve control of intrastate activities." Id. at 120. This
expansive reading of the Commerce Clause, coupled with the Court's narrow
view of the Tenth Amendment, left the amendment meaningless for thirty years
following Darby. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971)
(holding that anti-loansharking provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
covered illegal loansharking activities which occurred entirely within one state);
see also Katzenbachv. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298, 300 (1964) (upholding Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which mandated that a local, rural restaurant
in Alabama serve African Americans because the restaurant obtained 46% of its
food from an out-of-state supplier); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 247 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which required hotel or motel accommodations for African Americans by stating
that any hotel, motel "'or other establishment which provides lodging to transient
guests' affects commerce per se").
29 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2417.
30 Id. (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)); see also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 187-
92 (holding that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to impose federal
minimum wage and overtime requirements on state-run schools, hospitals, and
institutions); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119-29 (1942) (holding that the
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looked to determine whether a congressional act infringed upon the
state sovereignty that is reserved by the Tenth Amendment."
However, the two approaches are "mirror images of each other":32
if a power is granted to Congress by Article I, then the Tenth
Amendment does not retain that power for the states; if a power is
reserved for the states through the Tenth Amendment, then it is a
power not delegated by the Constitution to Congress.33 Thus, the
question is simply whether the Brady Act is "an incident of state
sovereignty [that] is protected by a limitation on an Article I
power.
34
This Note argues that the Brady Act infringes upon state
sovereignty that is guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment. This Note
presents the pertinent provisions of the Brady Act and then argues
that the Act violates the Tenth Amendment by requiring local
authorities to perform duties that are not required of them by their
state governments.35 Five federal district courts have addressed the
issue of whether the Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment.36
Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate a self-sustaining wheat farmer).
"' New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (1992) (citing Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) and Lane County v.
Oregon, 74 U.S. (74 Wall.) 71 (1869)); see also South Carolina v. Baker, 485
U.S. 505, 511-15 (1988) (holding that § 310(b)(1) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 does not violate the Tenth Amendment); EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 235-36 (1983) ("The appellees have not claimed...
that Congress exceeded the scope of its affirmative grant of power under the
Commerce Clause .. .rather, . . . appellees argue that ... application of the
[Age Discrimination in Employment Act] to the States is precluded by virtue of
external constraints imposed on Congress's commerce powers by the Tenth
Amendment.").
32 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2417.
33 Id
34 Id. at 2418.
35 This Note examines the constitutionality of the Brady Act in the context
of the Tenth Amendment and not the soundness of gun control. For analyses of
gun control, see Abrams, supra note 21, at 488; Dole, supra note 11, at 135;
Monica Fennell, Missing the Mark in Maryland: How Poor Drafting and
Implementation Vitiated a Model State Gun Control Law, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & POL'Y 37 (1992); Loomis, supra note 21, at 160; McClurg, supra note 11,
at 53.
36 Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v. United
645
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Four out of the five courts have determined that portions of the
Brady Act violate state sovereignty; 37 this Note examines these
cases and their holdings before concluding that the Brady Act is
unconstitutional.
I. PROVISIONS OF THE BRADY ACT
The Brady Act includes a background check provision which
requires that, before a federally licensed firearms dealer can transfer
a handgun to a purchaser, he or she must transmit a copy of the
completed background statement to the local chief law enforcement
officer ("CLEO") located in the purchaser's county.3" The Brady
Act defines a CLEO as "the chief of police, the sheriff, or an
equivalent officer or the designee of any such individual."3 9 The
CLEO "shall make a reasonable effort to ascertain within five
business days whether receipt or possession would be in violation
States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994); McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp.
321 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex.
1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
3 Frank, 860 F. Supp at 1043; Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1381; McGee, 863 F.
Supp. at 327-28; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1519.
" 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1). The statement contains the name, address and date
of birth appearing on a valid photo identification and a description of the
identification used, as well as the date on which the statement is made and notice
that the buyer intends to obtain a handgun from the dealer. 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(s)(3)(A), (C), (D). The statement must also indicate that the buyer (1) is
not under indictment for or convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year; (2) is not a fugitive from justice; (3) is not an
unlawful user or addict of any controlled substance; (4) has not been adjudicated
to be a mentally-defective or committed to a mental institution; (5) is not an
illegal alien; (6) has not been dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces;
and (7) is not a person who has renounced his or her United States citizenship.
18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(3)(B)(i)-(vii).
Prior to the enactment of the Brady Act, firearms dealers were only required
to have buyers complete the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Form
4473. 27 C.F.R. § 178.124 (1994). The form required the buyer to certify that
he or she was not prohibited by law from receiving or possessing a firearm. Id.
This self-certification was the only federally prescribed method by which a
firearms dealer could ascertain whether a transfer was prohibited. See Frank, 860
F. Supp. at 1033.
39 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(8).
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of the law, including research in whatever State and local record-
keeping systems are available and in a national system designated
by the Attorney General., 4' This provision will remain in effect
until the federal government provides a national instant background
check system.4"
The Brady Act forbids the dealer from transferring the handgun
until either the CLEO advises him or her that the transfer is legal
or five days have passed since the CLEO received the transfer
statement-whichever occurs earlier.42 If the buyer passes the
background check, then the CLEO shall destroy the statement, any
record containing information derived from the statement and any
40 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2). An example of a federal law that the chief law
enforcement officer ("CLEO") is required to review is 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which
states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person
1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
2) who is a fugitive from justice;
3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance
(as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substance Act (21 U.S.C.
§ 802 [1988]);
4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been
committed to a mental institution;
5) who, being an alien, is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable
conditions; or
7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced his
citizenship; to ... possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
41 One should recognize at the outset that the controversial provisions of the
Brady Act are only interim; a national instant background check is slated to be
established by 1998. 18 U.S.C. 922(t)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Regardless of
the length of time the relevant provisions are in effect, this Note demonstrates
that the provisions are unconstitutional and should not be tolerated even for a
minimum of five years (the time between its passage (1993) and the targeted date
of the national system (1998)).
In addition, the author doubts the ability of the government to meet the set
deadline of 1998, as well as the feasibility of creating a database of the necessary
size and accuracy.
42 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii).
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record created as a result, within twenty days after the CLEO
receives the statement.43 If a CLEO determines that a buyer is not
eligible to purchase a handgun, the buyer can request the CLEO to
provide the reason for the determination, and the CLEO "shall
provide such reasons to the individual in writing within 20 business
days after receipt of the request.",44 The Brady Act does not
specify exactly what the CLEO must check-it only broadly
requires the CLEO to ascertain that receipt or possession of the
handgun by the transferee does not violate federal, state, or local
law. Consequently, the check requires scrutiny of numerous
records.45
The Brady Act contains a penalty provision which subjects any
person who knowingly violates the Act to a fine, imprisonment, or
both.46 The penalty provision is ambiguous regarding whether the
CLEOs can be sentenced to jail or only dealers, who sell guns
without complying with the Brady Act, can be sanctioned.
However, the Brady Act does exempt the CLEO from civil liability
for "failure to prevent the sale or transfer of a handgun to a person
whose receipt or possession of the handgun is unlawful" and also
for "preventing such a sale or transfer to a person who may
lawfully receive or possess a handgun."47
The CLEOs will be relieved of their obligation to perform
background checks in 1998 when a national instant criminal
background check is scheduled to be instituted by the U.S.
41 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(B)(i).
4 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(C).
41 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(I), (II), 922(s)(2), (4). Among the
records that must be searched to complete a background check are all arrest,
conviction and appellate records, as well as records regarding pardons,
expungements and restorations of civil rights. These records are necessary
because a CLEO must determine whether a person has been convicted of "a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." See 18 U.S.C.
§ 92 1(a)(20) (1988). Medical, hospital, drug treatment and police investigatory
records must also be examined to ascertain if a person is an unlawful user of or
addicted to a controlled substance. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
46 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(5) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) states that "[w]hoever
knowingly violates subsection (s) or (t) of section 922 shall be fined not more
than $1,000, imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both."
41 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(7)(A), (B).
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Department of Justice ("DOJ").4' The DOJ will then maintain the
national system, which will consist of a computerized database of
information linking state and federal background check systems.4
Gun dealers will be able to contact the database either by telephone
or by other electronic means, and will be able to receive infor-
mation, within three days, on whether receipt of a firearm by a
prospective buyer would violate the Brady Act. 50 Once the
national database is functioning, the CLEOs will not be required to
perform background checks.5 Until that time, however, the Brady
Act does not provide funding, compensation, or other assistance to
cover the costs and resources for executing a reasonable back-
ground check.
Il. THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BRADY ACT
The past century marks a turbulent history for the Tenth
Amendment. In less than twenty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has
reversed itself twice, by narrow margins, on the issue of whether
state sovereignty restricts the scope of Congress' power.52 After
decades of ambiguity, the Court announced a bright-line rule in
New York v United States" when it declared that Congress could
not commandeer the states by directly compelling them to enact or
48 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1).
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1)(B)(ii).
50 Id.
5' See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1).
52 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547
(1985) (5-4) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery and holding that
Congress can impose federal requirements on state employers so long as the same
requirements are imposed upon employers in the private sector); National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (5-4 vote) (overruling Maryland v.
Wirtz and holding that Congress cannot interfere with states' ability to structure
the relationship between employer and employee in traditional government
functions such as wages); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 187-92 (1968) (7-2
vote) (holding that Congress could constitutionally apply the minimum wage and
overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act to employees in state-
run hospitals, institutions and schools).
" 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
649
JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY
administer a federal regulatory program. 4 Despite New York,
Congress passed the Brady Act, which directly conflicts with this
precedent. Accordingly, the Brady Act will give the U.S. Supreme
Court an opportunity to reexamine the Tenth Amendment and
affirm its holding in New York.
A. Supreme Court Precedent: New York v. United States
In New York v United States, the Court held that the take-title
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1985
("LLRWPA")55 violated the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment.16 The take-title provision offered states, as an
alternative to regulating according to the dictates of Congress, the
choice of "taking title to and possession of low-level radioactive
waste generated within their borders and becoming liable for all
damages waste generators suffer as a result of the State's failure to
do so promptly."" The Court concluded that Congress over-
stepped the boundary between federal and state authority; 8 the
take-title provision had crossed "the line distinguishing
" Id. at 2420 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). In New York, Justice O'Connor expanded the
principles set forth in Hodel:
In Hodel, the Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 precisely because it did not "commandeer"
the States into regulating mining. The Court found that "the States are
not compelled to enforce the steep-slope standards, to expend any state
funds, or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any manner
whatsoever. If a State does not wish to submit a proposed permanent
program that complies with the Act and implementing regulations, the
full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government."
Id.
" Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(b)-(i) (1988)).
6 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2429.
17 Id. at 2427-28.
58 Id. at 2428-29.
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encouragement from coercion,"59 where Congress had no constitu-
tional authority to offer either choice to the states.6"
The Court proclaimed that the LLRWPA violated both the
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment because it "'comman-
deers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,' an
outcome that has never been understood to lie within the authority
conferred upon Congress by the Constitution."'" Where the federal
interest is sufficiently important, Congress must legislate
directly-it "may not conscript [the] state governments as its
agents."62 The Court discussed at length the issue of political
accountability to constituents:
If state residents would prefer their government to devote
its attention and resources to problems other than those
deemed important by Congress, they may choose to have
the Federal Government rather than the State bear the
expense of a federally mandated regulatory program ....
Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than
compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the
local electorate's preferences; state officials remain
accountable to the people.63
Thus, the Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal government from
imposing costs on states through mandatory federal regulation such
as the Brady Act. Congress may not place the states in the position
of having to sacrifice state programs, which their electorate prefers,
to fund a federal program. Moreover, the Tenth Amendment
prevents Congress from shifting the brunt of unpopular federal
regulations and policies to the states. Although the Court did not
articulate the reach of the Tenth Amendment in New York, it
'9 Id. at 2428.
60 Id.
61 Id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
62 Id. at 2429.
63 Id. at 2424.
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precluded the federal government from compelling the states "to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program.
64
B. The Brady Act Violates the Tenth Amendment
Since its enactment, five federal district courts have examined
the constitutionality of the Brady Act. The courts in Frank v
United States,65 Mack v United States, 66 McGee v United
States67 and Printz v United States6" ruled that the mandatory
background check provisions are analogous to the take-title
provision in New York. These courts held that the mandatory
background check exceeds the powers delegated to Congress by the
U.S. Constitution and violates the Tenth Amendment because it
commandeers state authorities to administer a federal unfunded
program. 69 The court in Koog v United States,7" however,
deemed the Brady Act constitutional on the grounds that the Tenth
Amendment does not prohibit the federal government from
imposing minimal duties on state officials.7' The court in Koog
based its holding on the precedent established in Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v Mississippi ("FERC"),72 a Supreme
Court precedent which is distinguishable from New York.
'4 Id. at 2435. The Court also rejected the federal government's argument
that a statute cannot be an unconstitutional infringement on state sovereignty
when state officials consent to the statute's enactment. Id. at 2431. The Court
pointed out that the U.S. Constitution does not protect state sovereignty for the
benefit of the states, but rather protects individuals from tyranny. Id Congress
is not justified in exceeding its authority relative to the states on the basis of
consent by state officials. Id at 2432.
65 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994).
6 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994).
67 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
68 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
69 Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1043; Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1381; McGee, 863
F. Supp. at 327-28; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1519.
70 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
71 Id. at 1388.
72 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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All five suits were brought by local sheriffs with jurisdictions
located in rural, sparsely populated counties. 73 The sheriffs did not
have large staffs74 and generally were elected by the county
constituents.75 They primarily performed duties such as providing
court security, transporting state prisoners and mental health
patients, serving process and writs, investigating crime, patrolling
the jurisdiction and supervising the detention center and inmates. 76
Most of the sheriff departments were funded by the state, county
and other local groups.
77
All five sheriffs found difficulty fulfilling the obligations of the
Brady Act. The time that most of the sheriffs spent performing
each background check ranged from fifteen minutes to several
days.78 In addition, the sheriffs' budgets did not cover the costs of
7' Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1031 (992 square miles, 26,000 population); Mack,
856 F. Supp. 1375 (4,500 square miles, 28,000 population); Mem. Supp. Def.'s
Prelim. Inj. Mot. at 11, McGee (No. 2:94-CV-67PS) (469 square miles, 68,000
population); Pl. Koog Aff. at 1 7, Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376
(W.D. Tex. 1994) (No. DR 94 CA 08) (3,241 square miles, 55,000 population);
Pl. Printz Aff. and Decl. at 7, Printz (No. CV-94-35-M-CCL) (2,400 square
miles, 30,000 population).
74 Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1031 (2 full-time staff members); Mack, 856 F.
Supp. at 1375 (12 full-time staff members); Mem. Supp. Def's Prelim. Inj. Mot.
at 11, McGee (No. 2:94-CV-67PS) (45 full-time staff members); Pl. Koog Aff.
at 7, Koog (No. DR 94 CA 08) (13 full-time staff members); Pl. Printz Aff.
and Decl. at T 7, Printz (No. CV-94-35-M-CCL) (15 full-time staff members).
7' Telephone Interview with J.R. Koog, sheriff of Val Verde County, Tex.
(Jan. 13, 1994) [hereinafter Koog Interview] (Val Verde County has elected
Sheriff Koog to his fifth four-year term); see also Frank Aff. at 1 1, Frank (No.
2:94-CV-135); Pl. Printz Aff. and Decl. at 1, Printz (No. CV-94-35-M-CCL).
76 Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1032; Compl. at 1 10, McGee (No. 2:94-CV-
67PS); see also Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1375; Compl. at 10, Printz (No. CV-94-
35-M-CCL); Compl. at 10, Koog (No. DR 94 CA 08).
77 See, e.g., Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1032 (funded by state, county and private
security contracts); Compl. at 1 2, McGee (No. 2:94-CV-67PS); P1. Koog Aff.
at 1 3, Koog (No. DR 94 CA 08) (funded by the county Commissioners' Court);
Pl. Printz Aff. and Decl. at I 3, Printz (No. CV-94-35-M-CCL) (funded by the
county).
71 See Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1032; McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 326; Compl.
at TT 14, 17, Koog (No. DR 94 CA 08); Pl. Printz Aff. and Decl. at 6, Printz
(No. CV-94-35-M-CCL).
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the checks"9 and many were forced to use money budgeted for
other programs8 0 Faced with these problems, they challenged the
Brady Act in court.
The sheriffs contended that the Brady Act violates the principles
established in New York because it commandeers them to adminis-
ter a federal program.8' The sheriffs argued that "a federal statute
may not direct ... a local official to perform background checks
or otherwise implement a federal program."82 Some sheriffs also
asserted that by not funding the background checks, Congress shifts
accountability from itself onto the local authorities and CLEOs.1
3
Despite the sheriff's arguments, the district court in Koog held
that the Brady Act did not unconstitutionally commandeer local
authorities.8 4 The court interpreted the Brady Act as imposing
minimal duties on local authorities which were not in violation of
the Tenth Amendment. 5 Rather than giving New York a "broad
reading," the court interpreted New York as only prohibiting the
federal government from commandeering state legislatures.8 6 By
aligning the case with FERC, the Koog court declared that the
"minimal duties" imposed on the sheriff were constitutionally
permissive.8 7
79 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1375; Frank Aff. at 7, Frank (No. 2:94-CV-135);
Compl. at 12, McGee (No. 2:94-CV-67PS); Pl. Koog Aff. at 7 7, Koog (No.
DR 94 CA 08); P1. Printz Aff. and Decl. at 8, Printz (No. CV-94-35-M-CCL).
'o Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1515; Frank Aff. at TT 7-8, Frank (No. 2:94-CV-
135); Compl. at 9, 11-12, McGee (No. 2:94-CV-67PS); Compl. at I 11, Koog
(No. DR 94 CA 08).
81 Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1040; Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1380; McGee, 863
F. Supp. at 326; Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1387; Mem. Supp. Pl.'s Prelim. Inj. Mot.
at 13-17, Printz (No. CV-94-35-M-CCL).
82 Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1040; see also Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1378;
McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 326; Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1387; Mem. Supp. Pl.'s
Prelim. Inj. Mot. at 13-17, Printz (No. CV-94-35-M-CCL).
83 See, e.g., Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1380; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1514-15.
84 Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1389.
85 Id at 1388-89.
86 Id (citing New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992)).
87 Id. at 1388.
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At issue in FERC were Titles I and III and section 210 of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"), 88
which Congress enacted to combat the nationwide energy crisis.8 9
Titles I and III of PURPA related to regulatory policies for
electricity and gas utilities. 9 These titles, administered by the
Secretary of Energy, were designed to "encourage the adoption of
certain retail regulatory practices"9' by directing "state utility
regulatory commissions and nonregulated utilities to 'consider' the
adoption and implementation of specific 'rate design' and regula-
tory standards." 92 Although the federal proposals were detailed
and extensive, the state authorities and nonregulated utilities were
neither required to adopt nor implement the federal suggestions.93
The Court held that Titles I and III did not violate the Tenth
Amendment because they required only consideration of federal
standards-the states were not mandated to enact the regulations.
The Court declared that
[t]here is nothing in PURPA "directly compelling" the
States to enact a legislative program. In short, because the
two challenged Titles simply condition continued state
involvement in a pre-emptible area on the consideration of
federal proposals, they do not threaten the States' "separate
and independent existence," and do not impair the ability
of the States "to function effectively in a federal
system."94
The Court emphasized that PURPA represented Congress' attempt
to create a less intrusive scheme that allowed the states to continue
88 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645
(1988)).
8' Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745
(1982) [hereinafter FERC].
90 Id. at 746.
91 Id.
92 Id
9' Id. at 749-50.
94 Id. at 765-66 (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
852 (1976); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975); Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
71, 76 (1869)).
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regulating in a preemptible field on the condition that they consider
adopting the outlined federal standards. 95
In a separate analysis, the Court upheld section 210 on both
Tenth Amendment and Supremacy Clause96 grounds.97 The
provision directed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the
"Commission") to promulgate rules which state regulatory authori-
ties and nonregulated utilities must implement.98 Although the
regulations which the Commission adopted gave the state authori-
ties and nonregulated utilities freedom in determining the methods
to implement the regulations,99 section 210 required Mississippi
authorities to adjudicate disputes arising under PURPA, a federal
statute. 100
The Court determined that requiring the Mississippi authorities
to entertain federal claims was constitutional because it was not
burdensome on state authorities.'' Before PURPA, Mississippi
law provided citizens with the right to judicial action for state rate-
making laws that were similar to PURPA. 10 2 Because the
Commission has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims similar to those
arising under PURPA, "it can satisfy [section] 210's requirements
simply by opening its doors to claimants"'0 3 and making "its
administrative tribunals available for federal as well as state-created
rights.""'4 The Court interpreted PURPAs duties as minimal
because requiring the authorities to resolve disputes that arose
9' Id. at 763-64.
96 The Supremacy Clause states: "This Constitution, and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything
in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S.
CONST. art. VI, § 2.
97 FERC, 456 U.S. at 759-61, 768-70.
9' Id. at 751.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 760.
10 Id. at 768.
102 Id.
103 Id at 760.
4 Id. at 769 (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)).
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under PURPA only imposed duties that they normally conducted;
therefore, section 210 did not violate the Tenth Amendment.'0 5
In Koog v United States, the district court interpreted FERC to
support the Brady Act, asserting that the Tenth Amendment does
not inhibit Congress "from imposing minimal duties on state
executive officers."'' 0 6 The court determined that the duties
imposed by the Brady Act are both minimal and discretionary
because the CLEO can determine what is a reasonable background
search under the circumstances and can even decide that no check
is necessary.0 7 The Koog court based its decision on a letter
issued to CLEOs by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
("BATF"), which declared that the Brady Act is discretionary.0"
The BATF letter indicated that the CLEO will set his or her own
standards, and implied that in rural counties "where many handgun
purchasers are personally known to the CLEO," he or she will not
need to conduct a check.'0 9 Thus, the Brady Act requires the
CLEO merely to consider whether to perform a background
05 Id. at 768. The Court based this portion of its argument on the
Supremacy Clause as well as the Tenth Amendment. See supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
,06 Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1388 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
107 id.
"' Id. at 1379. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms' ("BATF")
letter, which interpreted the Brady Act, stated in pertinent part:
Each law enforcement agency serving as the CLEO will have to set it
[sic] own standards based on its own circumstances, i.e., the availa-
bility of resources, access to records, and taking into account the law
enforcement priorities of the jurisdiction. The law is designed so that
the law enforcement authority who is doing the check, is the one who
is most likely to have to deal with the consequences of the buyer
obtaining a handgun. Therefore, the CLEO of the buyer's residence has
a vested interest in conducting an appropriate check and ultimately is
in the best position to determine what is reasonable . . . . In rural,
sparsely populated counties where many handgun purchasers are
personally known to the CLEO, little or no research may be necessary
in many cases.
Id. (quoting Open Letter from BATF to state and local law enforcement officials
10 (Jan. 21, 1994) (on file with Journal of Law and Policy)).
109 Id.
657
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
check. " If the CLEO decides to perform a background check,
his or her duties are minimal.
The Koog court's conclusions lack merit. First, the background
check provision of the Brady Act is distinguishable from the
provisions of PURPA that were at issue in FERC. Second, the
court has no basis to conclude that the duties imposed upon the
CLEOs are minimal when in fact they are quite burdensome."'
Finally, by determining that the Brady Act is discretionary, the
court disregards the Act's congressional history.
The court in Koog draws a mistaken analogy between the Brady
Act and PURPA. In FERC, the duties imposed on the Mississippi
authorities by the federal government were no different from the
duties that they already performed under state law." 2 In contrast,
the Brady Act imposes duties upon CLEOs which they do not
normally perform. The state laws which prescribe the CLEOs'
duties and obligations do not generally include the execution of
background checks as the Brady Act requires."3 For those
CLEOs who already perform background checks under state law,
it is not as simple as the situation in FERC where all that the
Commission needed to do was open "its doors to claimants."'" 4
The CLEOs do not have the necessary staff, resources, or time to
meet the burdens imposed by the Brady Act." 5 Accordingly, the
obligations under the Brady Act are easily distinguished from the
duties under PURPA.
"o Id. at 1388.
.. Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1517 (D. Mont. 1994);
Compl. at 16-17, Koog (No. DR 94 CA 08).
12 FERC, 456 U.S. 742, 759 (1982).
113 Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Ariz. 1994); Compl.
at 10-12, McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (No.
94 CV-67PS); see also Compl. at 11, Koog (No. DR 94 CA 08). But see supra
notes 15-17 (citing state statutes enacted prior to the Brady Act which require
background checks).
114 FERC, 456 U.S. at 760.
... For example, before the Brady Act, Sheriff Frank would occasionally
perform a criminal record check; however, the sheriff's department workload
with respect to background checks approximately doubled after the Brady Act
became effective. Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (D. Vt. 1994).
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In contrast to the duties imposed on the Mississippi authorities
in FERC, the duties imposed upon CLEOs under the Brady Act are
burdensome.1 6 The CLEOs responsibilities include performing
a background check on the buyer, analyzing the applicable law on
which the determinations are made and ascertaining whether each
transfer is legal."7 Because the statute is ambiguous" -it does
not specify exactly what the CLEO is checking for nor the
particular records necessary to constitute a complete
search-CLEOs are forced to guess what records are relevant and
whether failure to examine them would be considered "reasonable"
or "unreasonable" under the Brady Act." 9 The Brady Act also
does not specify what the CLEO should do if the relevant record
is not "available."' 20 Each background check requires the CLEO
to review numerous categories of records, which have varying
degrees of accessibility.'12
116 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1517 (D. Mont. 1994).
117 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2), which states that a CLEO "shall make a
reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or
possession would be in violation of the law, including research in whatever State
and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system
designated by the Attorney General." (emphasis added).
18 Legislative history does not clarify the statute. For example, Congress
indicated that "[lI]ocal law enforcement officials are required to use the waiting
period to determine whether a prospective handgun purchaser has a felony
conviction or is otherwise prohibited by law from buying a gun." H.R. REP. No.
344, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984.
" Frank Aff. at 4, Frank (No. 2:94-CV- 135). The reasonableness standard
originates in § 922(s)(2) of the Brady Act. See supra note 117.
120 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2); see also Frank Aff. at 4, Frank (No. 2:94-CV-
135).
121 Because the records may be available in different areas throughout the
state and many recordkeeping systems are manual, it is difficult to retrieve all of
the necessary documents for a complete background check. See Mack v. United
States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Ariz. 1994); Compl. at 15, McGee v.
United States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (No. 94-CV-67PS); Compl.
at 9 17-25, Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (No.
DR 94 CA 08); P1. Printz Aff. and Decl. at 5, Printz v. United States, 854 F.
Supp. 1503 (1994) (No. CV-94-35-M-CCL).
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One example of the intolerable burden that the Brady Act
places on CLEOs is illustrated in the McGee complaint.'22 Missis-
sippi Code Section 97-37-5 states, in pertinent
part:
1) It shall be unlawful for any person who has been
convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, any other
state, or of the United States to possess any firearm ...
unless such person has received a pardon for such felony,
has received a relief from disability pursuant to Section
925(c) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, or has received a
certificate of rehabilitation pursuant to subsection (3) of
this section.
3) A person who has been convicted of a felony under
the laws of this state may apply to the court in which he
was convicted for a certificate of rehabilitation. The court
may grant such certificate in its discretion .... 23
Sheriff McGee criticized the demands of the Brady Act, arguing
that he would have to review each state's felony conviction records,
and disability records; in addition, he must check the Mississippi
courts' records to determine if a person convicted of a crime was
granted a certificate of rehabilitation. 2
4
After he locates the information outlined in the Mississippi
Code, Sheriff McGee would have completed only one-half of his
task-he would still be required to check whether receipt or
possession would be in violation of federal law. 25 Consequently,
122 Compl. at 16, McGee (No. A.94-CV-67PS).
123 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-37-5 (1972), see also id
124 Id.
125 The Mississippi Code only requires the CLEO to review federal felony
convictions. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-37-5 (1972). Under the Brady Act, the task
of ascertaining whether the purchase of a handgun violates federal law is a lofty
chore. See supra note 40 for a description of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). To ascertain
all seven stipulations of § 922(g), the CLEOs are required to examine countless
records located throughout the country. For example, medical, drug treatment,
police and judicial records must be examined to ascertain whether a person has
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the time needed to complete a background check is burden-
some.'26 Because many of the records are not accessible by com-
puter searches, CLEOs are required to travel to the location of the
record and manually search the files.'27 The time necessary to
complete a search may vary from one day to several days; with
numerous licensed firearms dealers in each county, CLEOs may
receive several requests each day, all with five-day deadlines for
completion.'28 Thus, the Brady Act imposes duties on CLEOs
that are far from minimal, requiring the CLEO to perform a
background check at the expense of other important duties.
The Koog court and the BATF misread the Brady Act as discre-
tionary; their interpretation ignores the legislative intent, the plain
meaning of the words found in the provision and the nature of the
been adjudicated mentally defective or committed to a mental institution. Compl.
at 17, Koog (No. DR 94 CA 08). The CLEO must also scrutinize the Federal
Register to determine "whether the person has received a relief from disabilities
by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) [1988]." Id.
18. In addition, because 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) allows a person who is denied
disability relief to petition the federal district court for review, a CLEO must
search the records of the district courts. Id. These are time-consuming and
burdensome endeavors. See also supra note 45 (describing other federal laws and
relating records which a CLEO must examine to complete a check).
126 For example, Sheriff Frank "spent approximately six hours on a single
search of a [National Crime Information Center] records check in which a 1963
felony conviction was discovered, but was not complete enough for a final
decision for the pending gun sale." Frank Aff. at 4, Frank v. United States, 860
F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994) (No. 2:94-CV-135).
127 id.
121 In April 1994, Sheriff Frank received 29 requests. Id. 5. Sheriff Printz
also explained how his office is susceptible to numerous requests for background
checks:
With 169 licensed firearm dealers in Ravalli County, I may receive
several requests per day involving intracounty firearms transfers. In
addition, Ravalli County residents are known to regularly involve
themselves in firearm transfers which originate in the other 55 counties
in Montana. Since the "residence of the transferee" in these instances
is Ravalli County, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(IV) requires [sic]
I perform the background check. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(s), I am
subject to a five-day deadline on each.
P1. Printz Aff. and Decl. at 6, Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503
(1994) (No. CV-94-35-M-CCL).
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check. The Brady Act states that CLEOs "shall make a reasonable
effort" to determine whether a transfer is legal. 2 9 Congress
rejected an amendment that proposed to make the execution of a
background check an option rather than a requirement by substi-
tuting "shall" with "may";13 thus, it appears that Congress' intent
was to enact a mandatory provision.' The Summary and
Purpose section of the House report also reveals Congress'
mandatory intent: "Local law enforcement officials are required to
use the waiting period to determine whether the prospective
purchaser has a felony conviction or is otherwise prohibited by law
from buying a gun."132 By asserting that CLEOs are "required"
to use the waiting period for checks, Congress demands the
execution of background checks. Furthermore, the phrase, "includ-
ing research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are
available and a national system designated by the Attorney
General""' indicates that Congress intended a reasonable effort
will include, at a minimum, research in the systems specified. 34
The Koog court's and BATF's interpretations of the Brady Act,135
therefore, ignore the congressional record.
The Brady Act is also not discretionary because the duties
imposed on CLEOs are not activities which CLEOs normally
perform. Under the Brady Act, CLEOs are required to determine
whether the purchase of a handgun would be in violation of federal
law.136 "Making determinations based upon federal law is a
discretionary function and not a type of activity in which CLEOs
regularly engage."' 3 7 Although section 922(s)(1)(A)(ii) of the
Brady Act stipulates that the transferor may transfer the handgun
at the earlier of the expiration of five days or a response from the
129 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2).
30 H.R. REP. No. 344, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984 (dissenting view of Congressman Steve Schiff).
131 Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1040.
132 H.R. REP. No. 344, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984; see also Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1041.
133 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2).
114 Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1041.
135 See supra text accompanying note 108.
136 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2).
"17 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1517 (D. Mont. 1994).
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CLEO,' this conditional provision does not mean that the
CLEOs are not required to execute checks. To interpret the Brady
Act as not imposing duties is implausible in light of the language
contained in section 922(s)(2), which states that the CLEO "shall
make a reasonable effort to ascertain within [five] business days
whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the law,
including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping
systems are available and in a national system designated by the
Attorney General.' 39
By stating that the CLEO shall perform the checks in section
922(s)(2), Congress mandates CLEO action, despite the seemingly
contradictory language in section 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(I). According to
the language in section 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(I), the CLEO's timely
action is one of two possibilities, whereas in section 922(s)(2) it is
a mandated inevitability. In other words, the language which
specifically directs the CLEO and outlines the measures that he or
she must take describes mandatory action, but Congress uses
conditional language to explain the legal obligations of the
transferor.
When Congress passed the Brady Act, it disregarded the
Supreme Court's lengthy discussion in New York regarding political
accountability. 140 Like the unconstitutional take-title provision, the
Brady Act shifts responsibility for the popularity or unpopularity of
the Brady Act from the federal government to the local authorities.
"Under the [Brady] Act, CLEOs make up the visible front line of
administrators of the [Brady] Act. Thus, they could become
associated with the [Brady] Act and bear the brunt of its unpopu-
larity. CLEOs will also bear the brunt of any incorrect determina-
tions they make."14' Many of the sheriffs are elected of-
ficials; 142 if they do not prevent the transfer of a handgun to a
.3 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(I), (II).
"" 18 U.S.C § 922(s)(2). For an example of a federal law that the CLEO
must review to complete a reasonable background check, see supra note 40
(describing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)).
141 See supra page 651.
'4' Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1514-15.
342 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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prohibited person, members of the community might hold sheriffs
accountable at the next election.
43
By not providing the funds for the background check, the Brady
Act also shields the federal government from fiscal responsibility.
Because Congress provides no funding, compensation, or other
assistance to support the costs and human resources incurred by
executing background checks, local legislative bodies and CLEOs
are responsible for these costs. CLEOs budgets may be increased
by the raising of taxes.'" CLEOs may also take resources that
were earmarked for areas of constituent concern and spend them on
checks which the community might not find as important. 45 In
either case, the federal government avoids being financially
accountable.
In the court challenges to the Brady Act, the federal govern-
ment has argued that the Act is analogous to Garcia v San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority.146 In Garcia, the Court examined
the Fair Labor Standard Act's ("FLSA") 4 1 imposition of mini-
mum wage and overtime requirements on state governments. The
Court declared that the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
"faces nothing more than the same minimum-wage and overtime
obligations that hundreds of thousands of other employers, public
as well as private, have to meet."'4 The Court announced that
the states' proper recourse against unsatisfactory legislation is not
the judicial process, but the political process through state participa-
tion in the Congress. '9 Garcia, therefore, established the princi-
ple that laws generally applicable to both state and private actors
'41 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1515.
144 Id. at 1515, 1517.
141 Id. at 1515.
146 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see, e.g., Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp.
1030, 1043 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (D.
Ariz. 1994); Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1515; Mem. Supp. Def.'s Prelim. Inj. Mot.
at 20, 25, McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (No.
2:94-CV-67PS).
147 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1988).
141 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).
149 Id. at 556.
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are constitutional, and the political process will control Congress
better than the courts. 150
"so Id. at 554. Garcia fundamentally altered the checks and balances of
federalism by empowering Congress to regulate state activities in the same
manner that it regulates private actors. Id. The decision also promoted the
political process as the proper restraint on federal authority in relation to state
and local governments rather than judicial review. Id. at 550-52. Because the
period between National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and
Garcia was marked with ambiguity and uncertainty, the Garcia decision serves
as a clear precedent for lower courts to follow. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1983) (holding that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 did not directly impair the state's ability to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental function. The Court based
its conclusion on the fact that "the degree of federal intrusion is sufficiently less
serious than it was in [National League of Cities v. Usery] so as to make it
unnecessary for [the Court] to override Congress's express choice to extend its
regulatory authority to the States"); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation A'ssn., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981) (developing a three-part test
for striking down legislation on Tenth Amendment grounds: (1) the statute must
regulate the "States as States"; (2) the statute must pertain to matters that are
indisputable "attribute[s] of state sovereignty"; and (3) it must be clear that the
states' compliance with the statute "would impair their ability to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions"); see also
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
States' rights supporters decried the Garcia decision, ADVISORY COMM'N
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, M- 147, REFLECTIONS ON GARCIA AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERALISM 5-6 (1986), and Chief Justice William Rehnquist
was foremost among them as he declared that he would once again command a
majority to restore the Tenth Amendment. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). But cf Jesse H. Choper, Law Before and After Garcia, in
PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM 13 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1987). In his essay,
Choper suggests a federal proposal:
The Court should not decide constitutional questions respecting the
power of the national government vis-d-vis the states; rather, the issue
of whether federal action is beyond the authority of the national
government and thus violates states' rights should be treated as
nonjusticiable, final resolution to be relegated to the political branches.
Id. at 17.
For a more in-depth discussion of this formidable area of Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence, see generally William T. Barrante, States Rights and Personal
Freedom Breathing Life Into the Tenth Amendment, 63 CONN. B.J. 262 (1989);
Murray Dry, Federalism and the Constitution: The Founders' Design and
Contemporary Constitutional Law, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 233 (1987); Martha A.
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The federal government argued that the Brady Act is generally
applicable to both CLEOs and private citizens, and it is primarily
directed at firearms purchasers and vendors to limit the transfer of
handguns at the time of sale.' The government contended that
because the Brady Act applies to both private and public sectors,
it does not intrude upon state sovereignty. S2 The courts that ad-
dressed the government's argument rejected it as "disingenu-
ous."'5 Unlike the FLSA, where identical minimum and maxi-
mum wages were imposed on all employers (state or private
individuals), the numerous duties imposed by the Brady Act are
specifically aimed at CLEOs. 5 4 The Brady Act imposes no corre-
sponding duties on private individuals to perform background
checks, and therefore, cannot be categorized as a generally
applicable law exempt from the restrictions imposed by the Tenth
Amendment.
Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a
Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1985); Phillip P. Frickey, Lawnet:
The Case of the Missing (Tenth) Amendment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 755 (1991);
David M. O'Brien, The Supreme Court and Intergovernmental Relations: What
Happened to "Our Federalism"?, 9 J.L. & POL. 609 (1993).
' Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1043 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v.
United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (D. Ariz. 1994); Printz v. United States,
854 F. Supp. 1503, 1515 (D. Mont. 1994); Mem. Supp. Def.'s Prelim. Inj. Mot.
at 20, 25, McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (No.
2:94-CV-67PS).
112 See, e.g., Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1043; Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1380;
Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1515; Mem. Supp. Def's Opp'n at 20, 25, McGee (No.
2:94-CV-67PS).
'13 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1380; see also Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1043
(stating that "referencesto Tenth Amendment cases that discuss the authority of
Congress to subject state governments to generally applicable laws ... are
inapposite because the Brady background check provisions are not generally
applicable but are directed solely at local law enforcement officials"); Printz, 854
F. Supp. at 1516 ("[T]he Act does not subject the states to the same requirement
as private actors. Instead, CLEOs are singled out to perform distinct duties. Thus,
the mandatory provisions of the Act do not constitute a generally applicable
law.").
'14 See supra notes 3 8-45 and accompanying text. Although the Brady Act
imposes several duties on the handgun dealers and purchasers, the obligations and
burdens imposed on CLEOs are vastly different and do not allow the Act to be
labeled a generally applicable law.
666
THE BRADY ACT
C. The Mandatory Background Check Provision Is Severable
Even though the Supreme Court should find the Brady Act
unconstitutional on the grounds outlined above, it does not need to
strike down the entire Act. If the purpose and effect of a statute
remain intact, the offending provision may be severed from the
constitutional sections. For example, in New York, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor determined that the unconstitutional take-title provi-
sion was severable from the LLRWPA. 5' The Court applied the
standard recently reaffirmed in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v Brock 56
which states: "Unless it is evident that the Legislature would have
not enacted those provisions which are within its power, inde-
pendently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if
what is left is fully operative at law."' Justice O'Connor de-
cided in New York that since Congress enacted a statutory scheme
for the purpose of addressing the problems of radioactive waste
with a series of incentives designed to achieve that purpose, the
"invalidation of one of the incentives should not ordinarily cause
Congress's overall intent to be frustrated."' 8 Accordingly, just as
the take-title provision was severed without defeating the purpose
of the LLRWPA or damaging the remainder of the statute, the
mandatory provision of the Brady Act 5 9 may be severed without
damaging the entire Act.
First, the Gun Control Act, which the Brady Act amends,
includes a severability clause which presumes that any provisions
15' New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2434 (1992).
156 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987). The Supreme Court in Alaska Airlines
declared that the severability test for unconstitutional provisions was well
established; for support, the Court cited Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108
(1976) and Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation Commission of
Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).
'5' New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2434 (quoting Alaska Airlines,
Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)). Congress' failure to include a clause
stating whether provisions are severable does not raise a presumption against a
statute's severability. Id. (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 686).
158 Id.
159 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2).
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deemed unconstitutional are severable. 6 ° Notwithstanding the
severability clause, section 922(s)(2) is severable by the common
law standard established in Alaska Airlines.16 1 Although removing
the mandatory nature of the check will weaken and suspend a
portion of Congress' objective, Congress would still have enacted
the remaining provisions of the Brady Act despite the omission of
section 922(s)(2).62 The five-day waiting period remains func-
tional and the opportunity for CLEOs to conduct a reasonable
background check remains optional instead of mandatory.163
Without mandating the CLEOs to perform background checks on
every purchase, the CLEO may now opt to perform a check at his
or her own discretion or at the discretion of his or her community.
The information and notification obligations imposed on federally
licensed firearms dealers and purchasers also remain fully oper-
ational.164 A purchaser must still disclose the information on a
statement as required by the Brady Act, 165 and the vendor must
still verify the identity of the transferee and send the transferee's
statement to the CLEO. 166 In addition, section 922(t), which
provides for the establishment of a national background check,
remains applicable without section 922(s)(2). 167
By severing the mandatory background check provision, the
requirements of the other provisions which impose duties upon the
160 18 U.S.C. § 928 (1988) provides: "If any provision of this chapter...
is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter ... shall not be affected thereby."
16' Alaska Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 684.
162 McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 327 (S.D. Miss. 1994)
(recognizing that deletion of§ 922(s)(2) will "weaken and eliminate a part of the
total Congressional statutory scheme for dealing with handgun purchases," but
finding that Congress would have enacted the Brady Act despite this provision;
the balance of the Act is fully operative without it).
163 See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1044 (D. Vt. 1994)
(holding that § 922(s)(2) is severable from the Brady Act); Mack v. United
States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1383 (D. Ariz. 1994) (same); McGee, 863 F. Supp.
at 327 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (same); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503,
1519 (D. Mont. 1994) (same).
6 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1), (3)-(6).
161 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(I).
166 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(II), (III).
167 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1).
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CLEOs become optional rather than compulsory. These provisions
lose their mandatory nature and will apply only to those CLEOs
who elect to comply with section 922(s)(2).168 By removing sec-
tion 922(s)(2), states properly retain the authority to decide whether
to require the performance of background checks by CLEOs.
Accordingly, by removing section 922(s)(2), the Brady Act no
longer commandeers the states and the remaining provisions remain
fully operational.
169
CONCLUSION
In 1992, the Supreme Court determined that Congress could not
commandeer the states by directly compelling them to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program. 170 In 1993, Congress
chose to ignore the Court's precedent when it passed the Brady
Act. The Brady Act shifts the administrative burden of executing
a law enacted by Congress onto the states. The federal government
must assume the political and fiscal accountability which stems
from the passage of a law such as the Brady Act. Despite the
steady deterioration of federalism and the seemingly vacant powers
embedded in the Tenth Amendment, one tenet prevails: Congress
16' For example, 18 U. S.C. § 922(s)(6)(B) requires CLEOs to destroy records
of the background check if the transfer is approved and 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(c)
directs the CLEO to provide a written explanation upon request to a denied
purchaser. These statutes will no longer be mandatory; however, a CLEO may
opt to follow these procedures. See Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1044 ("No CLEO is
compelled to comply with [provisions § 922(s)(6)(B) and (s)(6)(c)] because he
or she can choose not to participate in background checks at all."). To deter
unfounded refusals of transfers, the Court should require that if the CLEO
chooses to perform background checks, then he or she must comply with all
aspects of the Brady Act, including providing a written statement for the reasons
for denial if requested by the purchaser.
169 Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (D. Ariz. 1994). In the
alternative, the Brady Act may retain its mandatory nature if Congress enacts
provisions to fund local authorities for the performance of the background
checks.
17' New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2434 (1992).
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must legislate directly-it may not force the states to implement
unfunded, federal mandates. 171
By acting without any power pursuant to Article I of the
Constitution, Congress violated the Tenth Amendment when it
passed the Brady Act. By mandating that local law enforcement
agents perform background checks without providing funding,
assistance, or compensation, Congress crossed the boundary
between its federal powers under the Constitution and state
sovereignty as protected by the Tenth Amendment. Because the
Brady Act is unconstitutional, Congress faces two choices: it must
either provide funds for the implementation of the Brady Act or it
must repeal the portions of the Brady Act that mandate local action.
"' See generally New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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